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Living Well with Dementia Together: Affiliation as a Fertile 
Functioning 
 
Abstract 
Justice requires that public policy improve the lives of disadvantaged members of society. Dementia 
is a source of disadvantage, and a growing global public health challenge. This paper examines the 
theoretical and ethical connections between theories of justice and public dementia policy. Disability 
in general, and dementia in particular, pose important challenges for theories of justice, especially 
social contract theories. First, the paper argues that non-contractarian accounts of justice such as 
the Capabilities and Disadvantage approaches are better equipped than their contractarian 
counterparts to analyse issues of justice and dementia. Second, using a capabilities framework, I 
analyse original empirical data from qualitative interviews and discussion groups with health and 
social care professionals. The paper concludes that social connection is Ă ‘ĨĞƌƚŝůĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ? W a 
multiplier of advantage that enables people to live well with dementia together  W and should 
therefore be a priority for public dementia policy.  
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Introduction 
Dementia is defined by the World Health Organisation (WHO) ĂƐ “ĂƐǇŶĚƌŽŵĞ ?ƵƐƵĂůůǇŽĨĂĐŚƌŽŶŝĐŽƌ
progressive nature, caused by a variety of brain illnesses that affect memory, thinking, behaviour 
and ability ƚŽƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?t,K ? ? ? ? ? ?It represents a growing global public health 
challenge: in 2015 there were an estimated 47.5 million people worldwide with dementia (WHO 
2015), with this number expected to double every 20 years (ADI 2015). As populations age, 
governments across the world have begun to develop dementia policy strategies: examples include 
the EĂƚŝŽŶĂůůǌŚĞŝŵĞƌ ?ƐWƌŽũĞĐƚĐƚ (2011) in the USA; the National Framework for Action on 
Dementia (2015) ŝŶƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞh< ?Ɛ National Dementia Strategy (2009): Living Well with 
Dementia. 
 
Dementia is a source of multiple disadvantages. In 2010, the United Nations (UN) established a 
working group on ageing, to address the gaps in existing human rights standards in relation to older 
people: 
 
 “dŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ůĂƌŐĞŶƵŵďĞƌƐŽĨŽůĚĞƌƉĞƌƐŽŶƐĨĂĐĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ
discrimination, poverty and abuse that severely restrict their human rights and their 
contribution to ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ?hE ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
The disadvantages faced by older people in general are likely to be compounded for older people 
with dementia, since cognitive impairment ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ‘layer of vulnerability ? (Luna 
2014). Justice demands that public policy prioritise the well-being of the disadvantaged; therefore, 
improving the lives of people with dementia should be viewed not only as a global health priority, 
but as an urgent matter of social justice. 
 
Disability in general poses important challenges for theories of justice, particularly social contract 
theories. Some central features of contractarian theories come under severe strain in the context of 
disability. This paper argues that, to accommodate the moral claims of disabled people, it is 
necessary to appeal to non-contractarian approaches to justice; examples incůƵĚĞEƵƐƐďĂƵŵ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?
account of justice as equality of Capability, and Wolff and de-^ŚĂůŝƚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ?) analysis of Disadvantage. 
These approaches aim to include disabled people as primary subjects of justice, making room for 
disability at the conceptual stage, rather than leaving it aside as an  ‘ŽƵƚůŝĞƌ ?Žƌ ‘ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ?ŝƐƐƵĞ, as 
many social contract theories do (e.g. Rawls 1999). 
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This paper focuses on dementia as one particular kind of disability, and connects theories of justice 
with the public policy goal of improving the lives of people with dementia. The first section 
summarises the challenges posed by disability to social contract theories of justice, and shows how 
alternative, non-contractarian theories overcome those challenges. The second section sets out a 
conceptual framework for connecting dementia, justice and public policy. The third section uses a 
capabilities framework to analyse the results of qualitative interviews and discussion groups with 
health and social care professionals about living well with dementia. The analysis shows that 
affiliation is a  ‘fertile functioning ?  W a multiplier of advantage - for people living with dementia. The 
final section concludes, therefore, that supporting the social relationships of those living with 
dementia should be a priority for public dementia policy.  
 
Justice, Disability and Dementia 
Among the diversity of approaches to justice, social contract theories stand out as particularly 
influential. Social contract theories are based on the premise that societies are organised by a 
consensual agreement between citizens to cooperate with one another for mutual advantage 
(Hobbes 1996; Rawls 1999). In his seminal work, Rawls conceives of the contracting parties as free, 
equal and autonomous (p. 515). They are in symmetrical power relationships with one another, and 
 “are assumed to take no interest ŝŶŽŶĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?Ɖ ?147) - they have their own private 
ends that are either independent or competing ďƵƚ “ŶŽƚŝŶĂŶǇĐĂƐĞĐŽŵƉůŝŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ? Further 
assumptions are made about the rationality of the contracting parties, who make life plans and 
ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶ “ĐĂƌĞĨƵůĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨ “ĂůůƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚĨĂĐƚƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ?
This Kantian conception of personhood takes reason to be the source of the dignity of the person: 
on this account, a ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƐĂƐĞƋƵĂůĂŶĚĚĞƐĞƌǀŝŶŐŽĨƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĂƐĂŶĞŶĚŝŶŚĞƌƐĞůĨŝƐŐƌŽƵŶĚĞĚ
in her capacity for rational agency (Kant 1999). 
 
The logical structure and assumptions of classical social contract doctrine exclude people with some 
types of impairment from participation in society as primary subjects of justice (cf. Sen 2004; Silvers 
and Francis 2005; Nussbaum 2007). The remainder of this section provides a brief summary review 
of objections to contractarianism, and how they apply in the context of disability.  
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The first difficulty lies with the idea that mutual advantage is the goal of social cooperation and 
reciprocity. People with physical and cognitive impairments may be less able to cooperate on an 
equal basis with others; relationships between people with impairments and the social group are 
likely to be asymmetric in terms of mutual advantage, especially ǁŚĞŶ ‘ŵƵƚƵĂůĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ?ŝƐ
conceptualised in terms of economic productivity.  
 
A second difficulty concerns the contractarian account of the autonomous pursuit ŽĨŽŶĞ ?Ɛ private 
ends. This assumption fails to acknowledge the shared nature of many ends, and the relationships of 
solidarity, love, care and dependence within which people strive to live in accordance with their 
conceptions of the good. Neediness and dependency are inalienable features of human existence 
(Reader 2007). Asymmetric dependence is a feature of childhood and (often) old age, and occurs in 
the context of temporary illness as well as permanent impairment. Dependency does not set 
children and older, ill or disabled people apart from other people; rather, dependency is a spectrum 
onto which all human beings fall (Nussbaum 2007).  
 
A third concern with classical social contact theory arises in relation to the requirement that the 
contracting parties meet the demands of an idealized rationality that is narrow and overly 
demanding (Dresser 1995; Kittay 1997). For example, Jaworska (1999) argues that the ability to 
reflectively formulate life goals sets the threshold for personhood too high, and excludes people 
with some types of cognitive impairment, including advanced dementia.  
 
Advocates of a more inclusive social contract theory have argued that a social insurance system 
could provide the support needed by disabled people to participate in mutually advantageous social 
cooperation (Becker 2005). It would therefore be strategically beneficial for the contracting parties 
to agree to such an insurance system. Similarly, those choosing the principles of justice from behind 
Ă ‘ǀĞŝůŽĨŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞ ? ?ZĂǁůƐ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?would, in theory, incorporate considerations around disability, 
since this could be their fate when the veil is lifted. However, these arguments still fall short. By 
retaining the requirement of idealized rational agency, people with cognitive impairments are 
excluded as contracting parties themselves: they remain objects and not subjects of justice. As well 
as failing to meet the objection from idealized rationality, these alternative accounts also maintain 
individualistic ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ ‘ŵƵƚƵĂůĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƵƚŽŶŽŵŽƵƐƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨ
individual ends. 
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In summary, classical social contract doctrine is grounded in assumptions that create difficulties in 
accommodating disability, namely, the prioritisation of independence and individual rational agency, 
and a corresponding failure to recognise that dependence ĂŶĚ ‘ƉĂƚŝĞŶĐǇ ?i (Reader 2007) are 
inalienable features of human existence. On such demanding criteria for citizenship and personhood, 
many disabled people would be ineligible as primary subjects of justice. These are simplifying 
assumptions, made in pursuit of theoretical and logical clarity. However, ignoring the relational basis 
of personhood risks making the space between ideal-type and real-world social justice too wide to 
bridge.  
 
Non-contractarian approaches to justice and disability  
Given these features of the classical contractarian theory of justice, alternative accounts are needed 
for thinking well about justice and disability, and to provide a sound basis for ethical policy and 
practice. This section focuses on two such alternative accounts: the Capabilities Approach (Sen 1985; 
Nussbaum 2000) and the Disadvantage approach (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007). 
  
The Capabilities Approach 
The Capabilities Approach (CA) is a broad conceptual framework for the analysis of well-being and 
social justice. It departs from the tradition of welfare analysis that focuses on income and resources, 
and expands the definition of well-being to cover a plurality of valuable  ‘functionings ? that people 
can achieve in their lives (Sen 1985). The CA distinguishes between functionings - the  ‘ďĞŝŶŐƐĂŶĚ
ĚŽŝŶŐƐ ? that a person achieves - and capabilities - the freedoms she has to achieve valuable and 
valued functionings. Capabilities are determined not only by the resources a person possesses, but 
also her personal characteristics and the social, political and material environment in which she lives  
(Sen 1985).  ‘ZĞĨŝŶĞĚĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐƐ ?- the combination of capability (freedom) and functioning 
(achievement)  W have been argued to provide the most complete informational basis for the 
evaluation of well-being and social justice (Sen 1992; Fleurbaey 2006). This is an important nuance in 
the context of dementia and other cognitiǀĞĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌƐƚŚĂƚĂĨĨĞĐƚĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĨŽƌƌĞĂƐŽŶĞĚ
choice and agency. 
 
The conceptual apparatus of the CA can accommodate disability issues due to three distinguishing 
features. First, the CA modifies the classical assumption of social cooperation for mutual benefit. 
Based on an Aristotelian conception of the fundamental sociality of the person, the CA expands the 
concept of  ‘mutual advantage ? to include benefits based on the assumptions of inter-dependence 
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and shared ends, and other-oriented moral sentiments such as compassion, benevolence and 
altruism (Nussbaum 2007:91). This involves modifying the strong individualistic assumptions of 
independence and autonomy, and placing relationality at the ĐĞŶƚƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ P ‘Eo 
individual can think, choose or act without being influenced in one way or another by the society 
ĂƌŽƵŶĚŚŝŵŽƌŚĞƌ ?(Sen 2002:80). While Sen endorses normative individualism in relation to the 
ethical distinctness and moral status of each person, he also defines human beings as 
 ‘ƋƵŝŶƚĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇƐŽĐŝĂůĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚ ‘ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞĂĨĨŝůŝĂƚŽŶƐ QĂŶĚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƚypes of societal 
ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?^ĞŶ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?. Sociality is a central part of capability, and normative individualism is 
compatible with recognition of the relational basis of personhood and well-being. 
 
The second distinguishing feature also stems from the CA ?Ɛ Aristotelian account of personhood. 
While Kantian rationality is transcendental and sets humans apart from other animals, on an 
Aristotelian conception of personhood, the ability to reason is merely one aspect of a person as a 
social and political animal; as Nussbaum (2007:159) puts it, far from being contingent on an idealized 
form of individual rational agency, Aristotelian personhood is constituted, along with a plurality of 
other elements ?ďǇ “ũƵƐƚŐĂƌĚĞŶ-variety pƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐ ?.ii 
 
The third distinguishing feature of the CA relates to its pluralist and non-resourcist conceptualisation 
of capability. First, capabilities are defined as plural and incommensurable (Nussbaum 2000:81). 
Second, people have varying abilities to convert resources (commodities and other primary goods) 
into valuable outcomes, with physical or cognitive impairment being an important individual-level 
 ‘ĐŽŶǀĞƌƐŝŽŶĨĂĐƚŽƌ ? (Sen 1985). It follows from the two features of incommensurability and 
differential resource conversion that resource-based metrics of well-being are inadequate for 
capturing the rich plurality of living well, and the complexity of disadvantage.  
 
In summary, the modification of the contractarian assumptions of (1) social cooperation for mutual 
advantage, (2) independent autonomy and (3) personhood as individual rational agency, plus its 
rejection of  ‘resourcŝƐŵ ? ?enable the CA to accommodate considerations around disability in its basic 
concept of justice. 
 
Disadvantage 
Wolff and de-^ŚĂůŝƚ ?Ɛ(2007) account of Disadvantage extends the capability approach to well-being 
and social justice. Like the CA, the Disadvantage approach distinguishes between achieved 
functionings and the wider set of hypothetical capabilities available to a person, given her personal 
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characteristics and resources, and the environment in which she lives. Wolff and de-Shalit add an 
additional analytical dimension, characterising funcƚŝŽŶŝŶŐƐĂƐ ‘ƐĞĐƵƌĞ ?Žƌ ‘ŝŶƐĞĐƵƌĞ ?. A functioning is 
insecure if a person has a lower probability of sustaining that functioning due to exceptional 
involuntary risk and vulnerability, or because achieving the functioning entails (or will in future entail) 
sacrifice in relation to other important functionings (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007:72).  
 
The Disadvantage account is also based on a pluralist, non-resourcist conception of well-being. This 
pluralism is at the heart of the central problem that the Disadvantage project sets out to address: 
assuming that improving the lives of the most disadvantaged members of society is a requirement of 
justice and a pressing priority for public policy, how can the least well-off be identified on a pluralist 
account of disadvantage? For example, is a person living in poor housing worse off than a person in 
poor health? Given the incommensurability of the goods that constitute a good human life, and the 
complexity of disadvantages that constitute being badly-off, a single index of disadvantage is 
impossible. How then should the least well-off be identified? This is known as ƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶĚĞǆŝŶŐƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ? 
Dementia, Disadvantage and Justice 
The indexing problem relates to ƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞĚ ?ŐƌŽƵƉŽŶĂ
pluralist account of well-being. To solve the indexing problem, Wolff and de-Shalit (2007:103) 
introduce the concept ŽĨ “ĐůƵƐƚĞƌĞĚ ĚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ? ?/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŝĚĞntify the worst-off in society (and 
therefore show where the requirements of justice are most urgent) Ă ‘robust social ordering ? is 
required  W that is, a way of identifying the worst-off that is robust to the different weightings that 
might be given to different categories of disadvantage.  
 
The proposed solution rests on the observation that disadvantage tends to appear in clusters: 
people who are badly off in one important category of functioning also tend to be badly off in other 
categories. dŚĞŝĚĞĂƐŽĨ ‘ĨĞƌƚŝůĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĐŽƌƌŽƐŝǀĞĚŝƐĂĚǀ ŶƚĂŐĞƐ ?ŚĞůƉĞǆƉůĂŝŶŚŽǁĂŶĚ
why disadvantages cluster. A corrosive disadvantage causes and compounds other disadvantages, 
while a fertile functioning is a functioning that has positive spill-over effects in other areas of 
functioning (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007: ch. 7-8). 
 
Assuming broad agreement on what the important functionings are, the tendency for disadvantages 
to cluster provides a legitimate foundation for a robust social ordering that allows the identification 
of the worst-off.  
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The assumption of consensus around the most important functionings is a large one. Wolff and de-
Shalit use EƵƐƐďĂƵŵ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ůŝƐƚŽĨĞŶƚƌĂůapabilities as their conception of what matters most in 
a human life. Nussbaum frames her list as an overlapping consensus about a set of basic political 
entitlements, developed through philosophical reasoning, refined through empirical experience, and 
specified at a level that is abstract enough to be compatible with the principles of political liberalism 
(Nussbaum 2007). dŚĞƚĞŶ ‘entral ,ƵŵĂŶ&ƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂůĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? are specified in the broad 
domains of:  ‘Life ?;  ‘Bodily Health ?;  ‘Bodily Integrity ?;  ‘Senses ?, Imagination and Thought ?;  ‘Emotions ?; 
 ‘Practical Reason ?;  ‘Affiliation ?;  ‘Other Species ?;  ‘Play ? and  ‘ŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌŽŶĞ ?ƐEnvironment ?. 
 
The Disadvantage approach suggests ƚŚĂƚ “ĚĞ-ĐůƵƐƚĞƌŝŶŐĚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ?ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞan intermediate 
end for public policy. By breaking the causal connections between different types of disadvantage, a 
society would effectively eradicate the categŽƌǇŽĨ ‘ǁŽƌƐƚ-ŽĨĨŽǀĞƌĂůů ? ?ĂŶĚŝŶƐƚĞĂĚďĞĂďůĞƚŽ
concentrate on the final end of eliminating disadvantage in specific spheres of justice. dŚĞ ‘ĚĞ-
ĐůƵƐƚĞƌŝŶŐ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚďƌĞĂŬƐĚŽǁŶ the complexity of disadvantage, clearing the way for public policy 
to target specific disadvantages among particular vulnerable groups, and redress unjust inequalities 
in secure functioning. 
 
Dementia-related clustered disadvantage 
Dementia is a source of clustered disadvantage ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƐĞĐƵƌĞ
functionings. The symptoms of dementia typically involve  ‘a gradual decline in [the] ability to 
understand, remember, reason, comŵƵŶŝĐĂƚĞĂŶĚƵƐĞůĞĂƌŶĞĚƐŬŝůůƐ ? (AS 2010). Many people with 
dementia have co-occurring physical impairments that compound the effects of cognitive 
impairment. Dementia is also a stigmatised condition, and social exclusion is a widely reported side-
effect of a dementia diagnosis (ĂƌƚůĞƚƚĂŶĚK ?ŽŶŶŽƌ ? ? ? ?, ADI 2012). Older people, who are more 
likely to have dementia, are also more likely to have insufficient income to heat their homes 
adequately (Walker and Day 2012) and have lower ability to buy nutritious food due to budgetary 
constraints and mobility issues (Dowler ĂŶĚK ?ŽŶŶŽƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐŽĐŝĂůŐƌĂĚŝĞŶƚƐin the well-
being of people with dementia, with those of lower socio-economic status suffering further 
disadvantage in multiple domains, due to inequalities in access to healthcare, material and social 
resources and education (Basta et al 2007; Rait et al 2010). 
 
The clustering of dementia-related disadvantage has two related implications. First, it allows the 
identification of people living with dementia as among the worst-off in society. Second, this implies 
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that a priority for dementia policy should be the de-clustering of dementia-related disadvantage. It 
follows that public dementia policy ought to seek to identify fertile functionings that would help to 
de-cluster dementia-related disadvantage, and enable the effective targeting of separate spheres of 
disadvantage, leading to real improvements in the well-being of people living with dementia. 
 
Moving from theory to the details of how disadvantage can be de-clustered in practice is an 
empirical question. To identify fertile functionings, Wolff (2009:221) states ƚŚĂƚ “we need to appeal 
to social science ? ? 
 
Living well with dementia: An appeal to Social Science 
After a description of methods, this section presents an analysis of findings from primary qualitative 
research with professionals working in dementia care policy and practice.  
Methods 
Empirical research was conducted with experts involved in planning, providing, evaluating and 
budgeting dementia care. Fieldwork took place in the UK in July 2015, and consisted of discussion 
groups and telephone interviews involving 15 participants in total. The central aim of this qualitative 
research design was to gather rich, in-depth insights to illuminate and add content to a social 
capabilities model of living well with dementia. dŚŝƐ ‘ĞǆƉĞƌƚĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐŽŶĞƉĂƌƚŽĨĂůĂƌŐĞƌ
programme of research that, in its next stages, will include people living with dementia and their 
families. 
 
Participants were recruited through the Manchester Institute for Collaborative Research on Ageing 
(MICRA) network of over 1,200 policy-makers, practitioners, academics and members of the public 
in the UK. An invitation was emailed to a subset of the network, selected on the basis of their job 
title and organisation, and their role as decision-makers or practitioners in dementia care.  
Participants represented three local government authorities; two national non-governmental 
organisations; two private sector care providers; a community group; and two social enterprises. 
Between them, participants included both commissioners and providers of services designed to 
support the well-being of people living with dementia.   
Discussion groups and interviews were structured around the ƚŚĞŵĞŽĨ ‘ůŝǀŝŶŐ well with dementia ?. A 
list of important constituents of a good life with dementia was presented to participants as a 
discussion point ?dŚŝƐůŝƐƚǁĂƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚďǇƚŚĞůǌŚĞŝŵĞƌ ?Ɛ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?^ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝŶ-depth 
research with people living with dementia; participants therefore viewed it as a meaningful and 
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legitimate starting point for open discussion. Using this list as a prompting device also ensured that 
the voices of people with dementia provided the foundation of the discussions. The central domains 
valued by those living with dementia were:  ‘Relationships or someone to talk to ?;  ‘Environment ?; 
 ‘Physical health ?;  ‘Sense of humour ?;  ‘Independence ?;  ‘Ability to communicate ?;  ‘Sense of personal 
identity ?;  ‘Ability or opportunity to engage in activities ?;  ‘Ability to practise faith or religion ?; and 
 ‘Experience of stigma. ? Discussions were audio-recorded, transcribed, and analysed using thematic 
analysis. The analytical framework was Nussbaum ?Ɛtheoretical set of central capabilities (see above). 
hƐŝŶŐƚŚĞůǌŚĞŝŵĞƌ ?Ɛ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇůŝƐƚĂƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚEƵƐƐďĂƵŵ ?ƐĞŶƚƌĂůĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂƐ
analytical framework, means that the final analysis combines empirical legitimacy with philosophical 
sophistication. 
 
The following sections present findings for a subset of capabilities that emerged as especially 
important:  ‘ĨĨŝůŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?,  ‘>ŝĨĞ ?,  ‘Bodily Health ? ? ‘Senses, Imaginations and Thought ? ? ‘ŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
Environment ? ĂŶĚ ‘Emotions ? ? It is notable that all of these, with the exception of Emotions, were 
identified as among the most important functionings on EƵƐƐďĂƵŵ ?ƐůŝƐƚŝŶĂ  ‘ƉƵďůŝĐƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝǀĞ
ĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵ ?exercise with members of the public in the UK and Israel (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007). 
During the fieldwork reported here,  ‘Emotions ? emerged as an additional priority domain, reflecting 
the heightened importance of subjective experience for people with dementia (see below). 
 
Affiliation 
There are two components of the capability for Affiliation: The first relates to social relationships in 
general, while the second, ƚŚĞ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůďĂƐĞƐŽĨƐĞůĨ-ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ? ?ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶďǇƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŽĨĞĂĐŚ
person ?Ɛhuman dignity. Affiliation is defined as a central capability in its own right, and also as an 
organizing principle, since ŝƚ “ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞ ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĚƐƵĨĨƵƐĞ ?Ɛ ? ?ƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ: social relationships 
have both intrinsic and instrumental value in a good human life (Nussbaum 2000:82).  
 
The intrinsic value of affiliation 
As discussed above, the capabilities account of well-being is grounded in an Aristotelian social-
relational account of personhood and the good life. On this account, Affiliation would be expected to 
form a necessary constituent of living well with dementia. In support of its conceptual importance, 
discussion participants did indeed identify Affiliation as a central part of living well with dementia:  
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 “/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŝƐƚŚĞŽŶĞƚŚĂƚƉƌobably stands out for me, 
/ũƵƐƚƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚŝƚ ?ƐŐŽƚĂůŽƚŽĨĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůĞǀĞůƐ Qthat feeling of remaining connected to other 
people ? ? ? ? PPrivate Sector)iii 
 
 “/ƚ ?ƐůŝŬĞƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽůŝǀĞŽŶƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶĂŶĚƚŚĞǇŐŽĂŶĚƐƚĂǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐĨŽƌĂǁĞĞŬŽƌ
two, and the families say,  ‘Gosh, by the end of the holiday it was like they were back to 
ŶŽƌŵĂů ? ?^Ž/ƚŚŝŶŬŝƚ ?ƐũƵƐƚŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚƐŽĐŝĂůƐƚŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? P^ŽĐŝĂůŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ) 
 
It was even suggested that the capability for affiliation is sufficient for personhood: 
 
 “I feel personally that there is something [of a person] that will ĂůǁĂǇƐƌĞŵĂŝŶ Q / ?ǀĞĐŽŵĞƚŽ
that conclusion based on how people do still remain responsive to interactions with other 
people. EǀĞŶŝĨŝƚ ?ƐƌĞĂůůǇůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂůǁĂǇƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞ ? ?(2:NGO) 
 
This suggests that affiliation in some form is often possible even when other capabilities are severely 
diminished. This implies that, even in advanced dementia, personhood (on an Aristotelian account) 
remains intact, and so the life of that person continues to be a life worthy of respect. 
 
Both close personal relationships and the looser ties of wider social affiliation are important aspects 
of Affiliation. Close relationships with families and friends, and especially with family carers, 
constitute a central part of living well with dementia. Participants often used a social definition of 
well-being, focusing on inter-dependence and the shared ends and joint challenges of people with 
dementia and their families. 
 
 “/ƚŚŝŶŬĂŶǇďŽĚǇǁŝƚŚĚĞŵĞŶƚŝĂ ?ǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?ŝƚ ?ƐĂĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇŝŶƚĞƌĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽǁŝƚŚ
ƚŚĞŝƌĐĂƌĞƌ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬǇŽƵĐĂŶĞǀĞƌŐĞƚĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝĨǇŽƵ ?ǀĞŐŽƚĂ
ĐĂƌĞƌǁŚŽ ?ƐĂƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĂ ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐůŝĨĞ ?ĂƌĞƌƐŶĞĞĚĂƐ
much support as the person witŚĚĞŵĞŶƚŝĂĚŽĞƐ Qin terms of policy decisions, I think we 
ŽĨƚĞŶĚŽŶ ?ƚĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞƚŚĂƚǁĞĐĂŶ ?ƚũƵƐƚůŽŽŬĂƚƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶǁŝƚŚĚĞŵĞŶƚŝĂ ? ? 
(2:Public Service Commissioner) 
 
This quote demonstrates that people with dementia and family carers have both specific individual 
needs, and many shared ends relating to the capability to live well together. However, dementia can 
cause great strain on close relationships. This evidence These findings emphasises the need to 
understand a person with dementia in the context of their social network, and highlights the vital 
role of support for this wider network  W for family carers, and families and friends in general.  
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A social model of dementia extends beyond close personal relationships to include the looser ties of 
wider social affiliation. At the most general level, social attitudes play a central role in people ?Ɛ
ability to live well with dementia, and the social bases of self-respect. The stigma surrounding 
dementia often stems from fear and misunderstanding: 
 
 “dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƌĞĂůůĂĐŬŽĨƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĂŶĚĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĨŽƌƉĞŽƉůĞǁŝƚŚŵĞŵŽƌǇ
problems. Iƚ ?ƐůŝŬĞĐĂŶĐĞƌǁĂƐĂůŽŶŐƚŝŵĞĂŐŽ ?ǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?nobody spoke about iƚ ? ? ? ? PWƵďůŝĐ
Service Commissioner) 
 
An important theme to emerge in relation to this was the importance of recognition, patience and 
understanding on the part of service workers, such as people working in shops and public transport: 
 
 “Getting on a bus can be very worrying and frightening: where to get off, have I got enough 
money, will the driver be patient? ? ?dĞůĞƉŚŽŶĞ PE'K) 
 
 “[At the supermarket checkout] tŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂůĂĚǇ ?ƐŚĞŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŽƉĞŶŚĞƌƉƵƌƐĞ ?ĂŶĚ
in the end the young woman at the till took the ƉƵƌƐĞĨƌŽŵŚĞƌ Q/ƐĂŝĚƚŽŚĞƌ ? ‘KŚ ?ǇŽƵǁĞƌĞ
ŵĂƌǀĞůůŽƵƐ ? ?ĂŶĚƐŚĞƐĂŝĚ ? ‘Well that lady comes to me especiaůůǇ ? ? so she ŬŶĞǁŚĞƌ ? ?
(2:Community Worker) 
 
These examples highlight the importance of awareness among service workers in enabling people 
with dementia to access services and amenities.  
 
ƐǁĞůůĂƐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůƉƵďůŝĐĂůƐŽŚĂǀĞĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƌŽůĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ ‘ĚĞŵĞŶƚŝĂ-
ĨƌŝĞŶĚůǇĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?^ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚĐĂŶpromote secure functionings for people living with 
dementia: 
 
 “ QƐŚĞĐŽƵůĚĞŶĚƵƉŶŽƚŬŶŽǁŝŶŐǁŚĞƌĞƐŚĞŝƐ ?ďƵƚŝĨǇŽƵĐŽƵůĚĨĞĞůĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ ?ǇŽƵ
ŬŶŽǁ ?ƚŚĞďƵƐĚƌŝǀĞƌ ?ƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞŬŝŶĚ ?ŝĨƉĞŽƉůĞĂƌŽƵŶĚŚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞƐŚŽƉŽƌǁŚĞƌĞǀĞƌǁŝůů
know her and know where to send her back to, everything changes. Instead of it feeling like 
a world full of dangerous strangers, if it felt like a world full of people who would help, it 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŚĞƌǁŽƌůĚ ? ?(2:NGO) 
 
This quote expresses the transformational potential of a dementia-friendly social environment for a 
persoŶ ?ƐĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽůŝǀĞǁĞůůĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨĂĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŽĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐƐƉĂĐĞƐĂŶĚ
institutions of everyday life. It also highlights the close connection between social interaction and 
the social bases of self-respect. Supporting social inclusion and involvement in everyday activities 
ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞƐƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĨŽƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐďĂƐŝĐŚƵŵĂŶĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ ?ďǇŶŽƚĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŵƐŽůĞůǇďǇƚŚĞŝƌŝŵƉĂŝƌŵĞŶƚ ? 
This avoids stigma  W both self-stigma and stigma from others  W and is a central element of the social 
bases of self-respect. 
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Inter-personal communication is, by definition, a central aspect of affiliation; however, dementia can 
erode speech and language. 
 
 “/ƚďĞĐŽŵĞƐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ ?/ŐƵĞƐƐ ?ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĂƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞŶƐĞ ?ŝƚ ?ƐŶŽƚĂďŽƵƚŚĂǀŝŶŐĂ
conversation like this and saying  ‘I would like this, I would like that ?  W that decision-making 
and agency ? ?(2:Public Service Commissioner) 
 
 
It is striking that this participant disassociates social interaction from an idealized rationality, 
suggesting that meaningful communication and affiliation are not necessarily dependent on the 
ĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĞŶŐĂŐĞŝŶ “ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞĂŶĚƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐ ? 
 
The instrumental value of affiliation 
The empirical findings showed that, as well as its intrinsic value, social interaction buttresses many 
other functionings, and a break-down of affiliation is likely to create vulnerability in terms of secure 
functionings:  
 
 “People [often] lose their friends after diagnosis, and you hear those stories about what a 
massive impact that has on people in ƐŽŵĂŶǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚǁĂǇƐ ? ? ? ? PNGO) 
 
Affiliation is instrumentally valuable in a plurality of functioning domains. In a discussion about a 
social programme for people with dementia, a participant observed: 
 
 “ QĞŶĂďůŝŶŐpeople ƚŽĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚĞĂŶĚĞǆƉƌĞƐƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚĨĞĞůƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ
ůĞǀĞůƐŽĨĚŝƐƚƌĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚǁĞ ?ǀĞĨŽƵŶĚĂŵĂǌŝŶŐĐůŝŶŝĐĂůŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƐŽĐŝĂůŽƵƚĐŽŵĞs, in 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŵĞŵŽƌǇƚĞƐƚƐĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƚĞƐƚƐƚŚĂt have been done by clinicians Q ? 
(2:Public Service Commissioner) 
 
The role played by Affiliation in supporting secure functioning in emotional and cognitive health 
suggests that it may be Ă ‘ĨĞƌƚŝůĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ? ?In support of this, the instrumental role of Affiliation in 
other central functioning domains is set out below. 
 
Life and Bodily Health 
Despite the many challenges faced by people with dementia, participants agreed that a life worth 
living with dementia is certainly possible. At the level of social institutions, access to suitable health 
and social care is clearly foundational to the capabilities for life and bodily health for people with 
dementia, as it is for all older people and all people in general. Because people with dementia 
(especially at the advanced stages) may be less able to take care of themselves, the enabling role of 
others takes on increased importance in the domains of life and bodily health. Awareness among 
health workers is crucial: 
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 “/ŶŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ŵĂŬŝŶŐƐƵƌĞƚŚĞƐƚĂĨĨĂƌĞĂǁĂƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶŚĂƐĚĞŵĞŶƚŝĂĂŶĚƚŚĞǇǁŽŶ ?ƚ
ƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌƚŚĞŝƌŐůĂƐƐŽĨǁĂƚĞƌ ?ǇŽƵ ?ǀĞŐŽƚƚŽƐŝƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵ ? ? ? ? PNGO) 
 
The active awareness of medical workers of the vulnerabilities of people with different types and at 
different stages of dementia is an important social feature of secure functioning in the area of health, 
especially since people with dementia may have diminished ability to communicate and self-
advocate.  
 
Affiliation can also support people with dementia to engage in physical activity: 
 
 “dŚĞƌĞ ?Ɛ ŽŶĞ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ĐĂůůĞĚ ŝƌĐůĞ ĂŶĐŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ ĞŵĞŶƚŝĂ ?ĂŶĚ ŝƚ ?Ɛ ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ŐŽŽĚ ŝŶ ĐĂƌĞ
ŚŽŵĞƐ QĂƐƐŽŽŶĂƐƚŚĞŵƵƐŝĐƐƚĂƌƚƐƉĞŽƉůĞƐƚĂƌƚŵŽǀŝŶŐ QƐŽƚŚĞǇŐĞƚƐŽŵĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞ
ǁŽƌĚ ‘ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ?ŝƐďĂŶŶĞĚďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĂƚƉƵƚƐĞǀĞƌǇďŽĚǇŽĨĨ ? ? ? ? PPrivate Sector) 
 
This example showcases a sensitive approach to supporting the bodily health of people with 
dementia. The activity is founded on Affiliation: it is facilitated by others and performed together as 
a group; and the social bases of self-respect are reinforced through consideration of the social 
barriers that might prevent people from participating. 
 
Emotions 
Affiliation is also foundational in the domain of Emotions. Participants discussed many elements of 
emotional well-being, including feelings of happiness; being able to show love and give care; and 
humour. 
 
Some models of dementia-care prioritise subjective well-being, for instance, ƚŚĞ ‘ŽŶƚĞŶƚĞĚ
ĞŵĞŶƚŝĂ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞĚďǇJames (2008). These approaches, like hedonic accounts of well-
being in general, can be criticised for their value-monism, and for over-valuing subjective states 
( ‘ŚĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐ ?Žƌ ‘ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŵĞŶƚ ? ?, to the detriment of other aspects of a flourishing life (Austin 2016). 
However, participants suggested that subjective contentment may be particularly important to 
people with dementia, given the anxiety, fear and depression that can accompany the disease: 
 
 “TŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ/ƐĞĞ ?/ƐĞĞŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞŵƚŚĂƚĂƌĞũƵƐƚƐĂĚ ?ĂŶĚ/ƐƵƉƉŽƐĞ/ ?ĚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞ
anything other than sad. ? (1:NGO) 
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The special importance of subjective well-being is also linked to the observation that people with 
dementia, particularly those at a more advanced stage, have impaired access to memory and to the 
ability to plan ahead, so their immediate mind-state is especially important:  
 
 “WĞŽƉůĞ ?especially people with advanced dementia, are living in the moment, so feeling 
content is more iŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŵ ? ? ?dĞůĞƉŚŽŶĞ PE'K) 
 
This suggests that subjective well-being may take on increasing significance as other capabilities 
become diminished. However, most participants suggested that, important though it is, subjective 
well-being must be balanced against other considerations: an appearance of placid contentment 
cannot be taken as a sign that a person is living well with dementia, since it could indicate that she is 
under-stimulated or over-medicated. Again, the social-relational foundation of subjective well-being 
is central: 
 
 “/ ?ŵƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŽĨĂŐĞŶƚůĞŵĂŶ/ƐĂǁůĂƐƚǁĞĞŬǁŚŽĐĂŶ ?ƚĞǀĞŶŚŽůĚĂĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶǇŵŽƌĞ ?
but anything we can do to make him feel, in the moment, content, and listened to and 
valued, is going to be a big improvement on his ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? PCommunity Worker) 
 
Another important relational aspect of Emotions is the need to recognise people with dementia not 
only as recipients of care, but having the capacity and need to give care.  
 
 “dŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŽŶĞůĂĚǇƚŚĂƚǁĞǀŝƐŝƚĂŶĚŐŝǀĞƐŽŵĞĐŽŵƉĂŶŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƚŽ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞpretence is that 
ǁĞ ?ƌĞũƵƐƚƉŽƉƉŝŶŐƌŽƵŶĚĂŶĚƐŚĞ ?ƐŚĞůƉŝŶŐƵƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĞůƉƐŚĞƌƚŽĨĞĞů ?ǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?ƐŚĞĂĐƚƐ
as the perfect hostess, she offers tea, and we might have to help her makĞŝƚ ?ďƵƚƐŚĞ ?Ɛ
offering it because it makes her feel - she was a very sociable lady, and she did help a lot of 
people in her community wŚĞŶƐŚĞǁĂƐǇŽƵŶŐĞƌ ? ? ? ? PCommunity Worker) 
 
This example highlights the importance of the opportunity to give care in suppŽƌƚŝŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ
capability to feel emotions such as happiness, belonging and respect - both the respect of others and 
self-respect.  
 
A final aspect of emotional well-being is humour.  
 
 “ Qwhoever it was who was giving her fish and chips was talking about Blackpool [seaside 
town] ĂŶĚŚĂǀŝŶŐĂůĂƵŐŚĂŶĚĂũŽŬĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘KŚ/ ?ǀĞďĞĞŶƚŽůĂĐŬƉŽŽůĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĞĨŝƐŚĂŶĚĐŚŝƉƐ ? ? ? 
(1:Social Enterprise) 
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The importance of humour lies in the social and relational aspects of sharing a laugh and a joke, as 
well as the role of humour in creating a sense of normality, and connecting with a person on a 
distinctly human level. 
 
Overall, the discussions suggested that emotional well-being is relational, and Affiliation is a 
necessary condition for secure functioning in this domain. 
 
Senses, Imagination and Thought 
Strategies for engaging the senses and imaginations of people with dementia, such as art and music 
therapies, are relatively common in dementia care, and these experiences can enhance well-being in 
a number of different ways.  
 
 “dŚĞǇŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞŶŽƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌ ?ďƵƚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝng kind of takes you to 
a place. You may not have the words, but the smells, you recognise it Q/ƚ ?ƐĂďŽƵƚǁŚĂƚĂƌƚ
ĐĂŶƚƌŝŐŐĞƌ QŝĨǇŽƵĞǆƉůŽƌĞĂƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?ŝƚ ?ƐŚŽǁǇŽƵƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽƚŚĂƚƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐ Qte did 
some work recently with a day centre and nursing home, and the conversations that people 
ŚĂĚ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƐŽƵŶĚƐ ?ŽďũĞĐƚƐ ?ǁĞ ?ǀĞŐŽƚĂďŽǆŽĨŽďũĞĐƚƐƚŚĂƚŐŽƚƉĞŽƉůĞƚĂůŬŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? PArt 
Therapist) 
 
Experiences involving senses, imagination and thought, particularly relating to art and music, may be 
important because of the immediate experiential pleasure they can provide. As the quote above 
suggests, this kind of experience need not always require high levels of semantic or cognitive 
 ? ‘ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ? ?engagement beyond the direct sensory experience. Moreover, this kind of experience is 
likely to be dependent on social interaction of some form; affiliation, again, is of instrumental value 
for secure functioning in the sphere of Senses, Imagination and Thought.  
 
ǯ 
ŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌŽŶĞ ?ƐĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ encompasses (A) the political environment and (B) the material 
environment.  
 
(A) Control over the political environment 
Considering first control over the political environment, there are two main aspects for people with 
dementia: first, participation in the political life of the wider community and the nation; and second, 
participation in decision-ŵĂŬŝŶŐƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ to their care. 
 
With regard to participation in electoral politics at the local and national levels, different people 
have different levels of capacity and interest, depending on a variety of factors, including, for 
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example, the type and stage of dementia, and their personal interest in politics. Nussbaum (2007) 
suggests that guardianship arrangements can be a useful means of enabling people with impaired 
cognitive capacity to participate in this type of activity. This demonstrates the role of affiliation in 
the creation of capability and secure functioning in this domain. 
 
The second aspect of control over the political environment is participation in decisions that affect 
everyday life. Given that people with dementia have greater dependence on others for secure 
functioning in many domains, it seems especially important that there should be mechanisms to 
enable involvement in decision-making. This might range from including people in choices about 
what to wear each day, to advance care directives that enable people to have deeper and more 
general involvement in how they wish to be cared for at later stages. It may also be possible for 
some people with dementia to be involved in the evaluation of services (Cheston et al 2000). 
 
(B) Control over the material environment 
For people with dementia, the capability for control over the material environment may refer to the 
relatively limited environment of a residential care home, or to private homes and the wider 
community. For people living in the community, the capability for control over the material 
environment depends on a great number of actors and agencies, including every-day institutions 
(including the people who work in them), the wider public, and the physical (built) environment. 
 
The priority of making public spaces easy to navigate and use, for example through clear signage and 
places to sit down, was highlighted as an important enabler of control over the environment:  
 
 “[We need] universal public spaces to be welcoming, you know, the physical environment or 
the building to be designed in a way which means that somebody with dementia could get 
around: Iƚ ?ƐŶŽƚĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŶ ?ƚƚŽŽŵĂŶǇĨĂůůƐƌŝƐŬƐ ?ǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?ĂůůƚŚĞ ǁĂůůƐĚŽŶ ?ƚ
ůŽŽŬƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƐŽǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƌƌŝĚŽƌǇŽƵ ?ƌĞŝŶ ? ?(2:Public Service Commissioner) 
 
The role of affiliation  W of both close others and the wider social group - in enabling people with 
dementia to have control over their political and material environment is clear. On the other hand, 
participants noted that conflicts can arise between the interests of a person with dementia and 
family members and carers. There are inevitable imbalances of power involved in these relationships, 
and exploitation, including financial exploitation, cannot be discounted (e.g. Pinsker et al 2010). This 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚĂĨĨŝůŝĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇďƵƚŶŽƚƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĨŽƌƐĞĐƵƌĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌŽŶĞ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚ
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material environment, since other features of the material and policy environment play an 
important role. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper has situated  ‘LŝǀŝŶŐǁĞůůǁŝƚŚĚĞŵĞŶƚŝĂ ?as an issue of social justice. Some theories of 
justice do better than others in relation to disability in general, and dementia in particular. While 
classical social contract theories rely on narrow assumptions about mutual advantage and individual 
rational agency, alternative approaches are able to accommodate people with impairments as 
primary subjects of justice, due to different assumptions about the nature of personhood and well-
being.  
 
The Disadvantage and Capabilities approaches demonstrate how the classical assumptions can be 
replaced with a social account of personhood and well-being as relational (not individual) concepts. 
This social account is based on recognition of the bonds of solidarity, dependence and care that 
constitute a human life. The empirical part of the paper provides support for the modification of the 
classical contractarian assumptions, in favour of a focus on shared ends, patiency, and an account of 
personhood that does not rely on a narrow, idealized account of rationality.  
 
The Disadvantage approach pioneered by Wolff and de-Shalit provides a theoretical framework for 
(1) identifying vulnerable groups based on the presence of clustered disadvantage and (2) 
developing strategies for reducing vulnerability and enhancing well-being among the disadvantaged, 
through the identification of fertile functionings.  First, the international evidence shows that people 
living with dementia suffer clustered disadvantage - insecure functioning across multiple domains of 
life. Improving the lives of this vulnerable group is therefore an urgent issue of justice. Second, this 
study has highlighted the intrinsic and instrumental value of affiliation in the creation of social 
arrangements that enable people to live well with dementia.  
 
It is notable that the empirical finding of affiliation as ĂĨĞƌƚŝůĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐĂůŝŐŶƐǁŝƚŚEƵƐƐďĂƵŵ ?Ɛ
identification (based on philosophical reasoning) of affiliation as playing a special role in a good 
human life, organizing and suffusing other capabilities (2000:82).  Another particularly noteworthy 
conclusion emerging from the empirical findings is that, in contrast to the Kantian position that 
individual rational agency is the foundation of personhood, an Aristotelian account of the capability 
for affiliation as the basis of personhood enables the inclusion of persons with cognitive impairments 
as primary subjects of justice. 
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In practical terms, supporting the social relationships of people with dementia sustains and 
promotes secure functioning in multiple domains, and enables people to live well with dementia 
together. As well as close personal relationships, the weak ties of affiliation - for example, patient 
and understanding service workers, and passers-by who are willing to help - enable a person with 
dementia to participate in the life of her community, and are part of the social bases of self-respect. 
In summary, this paper has suggested that affiliation - the strong and weak ties of social life  W is a 
fertile functioning, a multiplier of advantage that underpins and catalyses secure functioning across 
a plurality of domains. It follows that, when resources are limited and pragmatic decisions must be 
made between multiple valuable ends, a focus on affiliation would be a reasonable policy strategy. 
 
In relation to resources, research participants emphasised that a focus on affiliation would not 
necessarily lead to increased expenditure, and could actually save money. For example, during 
discussions around simple and creative ways to improve the quality of everyday interactions 
between people living with dementia and paid carers, participants observed: 
 
  “AĐƚƵĂůůǇƚŚĂƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚĐŽƐƚĂŶǇŵŽƌĞŵŽŶĞǇǁŚĂƚƐŽĞǀĞƌ Q ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶ ?ƚĂŶǇŵŽƌĞŵŽŶĞǇŝŶ
ƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ƐŽǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚĞǆƉĞĐƚto start commissioning vastly expensive specialist services, 
but actually [in any case] the traditional models of care are not fit for purpose for people 
with dementia ? ?(2: Public Service Commissioner) 
 
 “ p^ending an hour with somebody rather than fifteen minutes QĂůůŽĨƚŚŽƐĞƐŝŵƉůĞƚŚŝŶŐƐ  Q 
I believe it would save money overall ? ?(2: Community Worker) 
 
This is a further indication, from the perspectives of professionals involved in budgeting for 
dementia care, that supporting secure affiliation would be both a reasonable and desirable strategy 
for public policy to address dementia-related social injustice. 
 
Conclusion 
Justice requires that public policy improve the lives of the disadvantaged. Dementia is a source of 
multiple disadvantages. Therefore, as a matter of social justice, public policy should aim to improve 
the well-being of people living with dementia. Non-contractarian approaches to justice, such as the 
Capabilities Approach, are better equipped than their contractarian counterparts to conceptualise 
and analyse issues of justice and disability, and therefore to provide a sound foundation for ethical 
public health policy. Through an analysis of original empirical research, this study shows that, in the 
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context of dementia, affiliation ŝƐĂ ‘ĨĞƌƚŝůĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ? PĂƐǁĞůůĂƐits intrinsic value in living well with 
dementia, it is instrumental in many other valuable functionings. This confers a duty on society to 
strive to achieve secure affiliation for all people living with dementia, as the foundation of a just 
society in which a life with dementia is valued as a dignified and worthwhile human life. 
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Notes 
iZĞĂĚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĚĞĨŝŶĞƐ ‘ƉĂƚŝĞŶĐǇ ?ĂƐƚŚĞŽďǀĞƌƐĞŽĨ ‘ĂŐĞŶĐǇ ? ? 
ii
Cognitive impairment poses an especially complex set of ethical questions in relation to practical reasoning, 
agency and personal identity (e.g. Dworkin 1993). These are set aside in the current paper. See Chiong (2012) 
for an overview. 
iiiYƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐƐŚŽǁŐƌŽƵƉŶƵŵďĞƌĂŶĚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽƌƌŽůĞŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ‘ ? PE'K ?
means that the cited participant was in Group 2, and worked for a non-governmental organisation. 
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